How the other half lives

It's good every once in awhile to rise above the surface of the health care market and see how the real economy does things. Today the Times had an article about the barriers to adoption of near field communication (NFC) technology, which would allow you to swipe your phone over a reader to make credit card transactions. The technology is already in use today in Japan and in the UK, but it's facing many obstacles in the US market.

As described in the article, the issue is not technology. By 2012, most phones are expected to have the technology built-in, yet the availability of the "wave-and-pay" function could take much longer. As an industry expert explained:

For that to happen, all the players will have to work together to define standards, determine revenue-sharing, expand the network of electronic readers and think through the other parts of what he calls "this 2,000-piece puzzle."

The expectation is that a trade association, the NFC Forum, which represents 150 stakeholders in this field, will forge the way to a solution. Yet, the same industry expert warns:

...it is completely possible that nothing will happen in mobile phones in the next five years if everybody keeps thinking only about their own piece of puzzle.

I have no doubt that they're going to figure this out and we'll be waving our phones all over the place relatively soon. Reflecting on the somewhat similar dilemma we face with respect to healthcare IT, I'm struck by two big differences that make health care harder.

First, we'd be lucky if we had only 150 stakeholders. Part of our dilemma in healthcare IT is that the demand- and supply-sides of the industry aren't just fragmented, they're atomized. On the demand-side, there are over 1000 health insurers in the US, and on the supply-side, almost 8,000 hospitals and 170,000 office-based physician practices. HITSP and CCHIT have done a nice job bringing together the technology suppliers (in the latter case, probably too good a job....), but they're only addressing the technical side of this issue. NeHC is supposed to be a forum to forge consensus on market-blocking issues, but they're a top-down creation of the federal government, not the result of the burgeoning demands of underlying grassroots contituencies.

Second, the benefits of health IT aren't as crisp and clear as easier credit card transactions, so our customers (ie, patients) aren't exactly clamboring for what health IT has to offer. Most of us use credit cards very often (all right, probably too often), so little tiny convenience benefits accrue in an obvious way. Most of us don't use the health care system that often, however, so the convenience factor isn't all that meaningful to a lot of us, and so the appeal has to be on less immediate benefits (safety, quality, etc) that are harder to grasp (and believe).

Like the "wave and pay" issue, the obstacle in health care IT is decidedly not the technology. If we can't get "wave and pay" into the market by 2012, what hope do we have of achieving the President's goal of universal EHR adoption by 2014? It's clearly going to take a much larger "forcing function" than the health care market will be able to muster on its own. The Congress' watered down version of the President's health IT vision clearly isn't going to provide that "forcing function", however, so it looks like we're going to have to place our hopes on health care reform.

More woes for NHS

When I was younger, I took an immersion Russian course at Norwich University in Vermont. On the first day, our teacher, who was himself a gifted, fluent non-native Russian speaker, asked each of us why we wanted to learn Russian. One of the students said "I've always dreamed of reading War and Peace in the original." The teacher responded in a joking tone that revealed the hard truth: "Yes, and I too hope to be able to do that someday." We all realized in that moment that we had a hard slog ahead.

I was reminded of that moment when I read an article in this week's Economist magazine about the UK National Health Services's much troubled "Choose and Book" system (see Notional Health Server). The goal of the system is to "allow patients in the National Health Service (NHS), advised by their doctors, to choose the treatment they want, and book an appointment when they want it." Unfortunately, after 3 years of hard work, it still hasn't worked out that way. Over 50% of physicians have a negative view of the system according to the British Medical Association. One of the physicians interviewed said that in her experience the system is so slow that it takes about 2 minutes for each visit request, and even then, it functions properly only 10% of the time.

Those familiar with health IT will immediately recognize how ambitious Choose & Book goals are and, I suspect, feel sympathy for their plight. As the article put it, the system will only perform as designed if everything goes right, meaning that the hospital, physician, and health trust systems that it needs to interact with fit together perfectly, and that the physicians and administrators who use those systems fit together perfectly as well. You would think that this could be accomplished in a government-owned health system...........and you'd be wrong. Which leaves those of us living in a highly decentralized system wondering just how ambitious we should be.

Unfortunately, users, and especially physician users, assume that they'll immediately be able to do the kinds of things that Choose & Book is supposed to, and it's often hard to ratchet expectations back to reality. In the MAeHC pilot projects, we're launching health information exchanges in three pilot communities and we're constantly in the struggle of trying to prevent the perfect from being the enemy of the good by reminding physicians that the first version is "Version 1.0" which will be improved over time. It's fantastic that our users are engaged and they want to get value out of the system; it won't be fantastic if "Version 1.0" isn't good enough to want them to stick around for Versions 2, 3, and 4.

I find managing this tension -- between designing the perfect architecture vs launching something good and attainable -- to be one of the biggest challenges in the health IT space. The most difficult part of the challenge is that the culprit isn't the technology, it's the lack of alignment of the technology and processes used by the most important data sources, hospitals and physician offices. It's the same problem faced by Dossia and Microsoft's Health Vault and Google Health -- will our users be willing to wait for the system to catch up with the technology?

My kingdom for an inter-operable vendor!

The following was forwarded to me by one of our vendors (which is ironic, once you see the content).

The heads of the two leading health IT projects in the world -- Richard Granger of the UK's Connecting for Health, and Richard Alvarez, the head of Canada's Infoway -- spoke at a recent conference and complained loudly about the state of the health IT industry (see "NHS chief chides vendors for promising more than they deliver").

"Vendors! You can't do these projects without them, but many of the products proferred can't do the job," exclaimed Granger. Adding to the fray, Alvarez stated: "Vendors continue to say they can do it -- but they can't. We don't have a single vendor that is truly interoperable."

Noting that the American approach is to proceed more cautiously -- through standards development, certification, evaluation, ROI calculations and multiple panels and commissions -- Granger quipped: "Some people lack the spine...to bring about systemic benefits and seek only to engineer point-to-point benefits." This approach, he said, is "doomed to fail."

I've got only one thing to say about Granger's comments: Hear, Hear!!

Keeping my fingers crossed for Kaiser

There was a depressing story in today's Los Angeles Times about Kaiser's $4 billion EHR implementation project. Apparently, technical problems with the project have dramatically increased costs (by about $1 billion) and are also threatening patient safety. Not suprisingly, morale seems to be dropping faster than George Bush's credibility (okay, maybe not that fast), and it's not clear that management has fully grasped the seriousness of the situation, as reflected in the following pair of quotes:

"This is the worst [technology] project I have seen in my 25 years in the business," said Andrew Brewer, a systems analyst for Kaiser who worked on the project for two years before voluntarily leaving the HMO last week.

"This is one of the largest and most ambitious efforts anywhere in the world to modernize our healthcare system," Kaiser Chief Executive George Halverson said. Considering that, he said, "it couldn't be going better."

As one who's also on the front lines of EHR implementations, I feel Kaiser's pain. Large-scale EHR implementation is extremely challenging, and the end-users are usually not nearly as flexible and forgiving as they should be given the immaturity of the technology.

Though they're a continent away, I'm worried about Kaiser's implementation, because a failure at Kaiser will reverberate throughout the healthcare industry. Why is that? It's because when you tick off the key success factors for effective EHR implementation, Kaiser seems to have it all.

As an HMO, they are both insurer and health care provider, which means that they stand to capture all of the benefits of their EHR. They can order their physicians to use the systems in ways that offer the greatest value, and they can fully capture all of the gains that accrue from better outcomes, higher safety, and cost efficiency. They've got world-class researchers who can use the EHR data to not only better measure their own progress, but to also generate tons of interesting and ground-breaking research. Finally, they've got an extremely capable staff, and they're using one of the best EHR products from one of the most highly regarded EHR companies in the industry (Epic).

In short, if Kaiser can't get this done, and also show that they're getting real value after it's up and running, there'll be a lot of disillusionment about the prospects of getting it done among the 80% of physicians who don't have an EHR today -- physicians who don't have anywhere near the sophistication, resources, and incentive that Kaiser has.

So, best of luck, Kaiser, in your efforts to turn this around. I'm rooting for you!

John Halamka reviews operating systems

I was at a meeting a few months ago with John Halamka, CIO of Beth Israel Deaconness Medical Center. As the meeting was getting organized, I was startled to see him settling in behind a MacBook. This surprised me because I'd come to feel a sort of comraderie and affirmation from being in meetings with John where we were both multi-tasking on our quiet, confident ThinkPads.

After the meeting, in the parking lot, I confronted John on his betrayal (thus revealing all of my own tech insecurities), and he explained that he was doing a review of different operating systems for CIO Magazine. The full review was published in the December issue of CIO, and an update was published this week.

I've come to rely on John's clear and simple explanations of highly technical information for the work that we do at MAeHC. His insights in the CIO review are a terrific read for anyone who wants a clear explanation of the state of the OS market from a consumer's perspective.

Coming soon, John's going to have his DNA sequenced and posted on the web. I'm going to be the first to download it -- I can't wait to get my hands on the recipe for doing everything that he does......